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Abstract 
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This is a review article; its purpose is to support a debate on the use of the best available 
economic theory and evidence in monetary policy in contemporary South Africa. In order to 
do so, I contrast South Africa's laissez-faire management of capital flows with the experience 
of other countries where the authorities have opted to use capital control techniques of one 
type or another.  The empirical evidence is fairly substantial, capital control techniques can 
play a useful part in staving off fragility and financial crisis in the event of sharp surges in 
capital flows. The key idea is that capital control techniques would offer the authorities more 
freedom and flexibility in the management of capital flows and the pursuit of monetary 
policy. The article follows on from Mohammed (2010) who concludes that South African 
policy makers have not yet learned the relevant lessons stemming from their neoliberal 
embrace. This article takes up that theme and uses macroeconomic data to show that without 
capital controls South Africa courts a financial crisis that can be transmitted via any one of at 
least three channels.   
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Introduction   
 
The main feature of the global political economy over the last thirty years has been the 
financialisation of the world economy. In most other countries financialisation is to be seen 
as an external imperative emanating from the needs of Anglo Saxon Capitalism, but in South 
Africa financialisation is also an internal phenomenon, emanating from the needs of the 
minerals-energy-complex (M-E-C) conglomerates in the post apartheid world. A direct 
consequence of financialisation has been the unprecedented rise in cross border flows of 
capital; today, capital is infinitely more mobile than at any other time in history. Thus for all 
developing countries there is now a new policy challenge – financialisation dictates that 
policy must  be framed in a context where mobile capital can now exact a punishing price for 
the “wrong” policies. According to Koelble and LiPuma (2006):  “...the globalizing 
processes now in  motion impose such powerful constraints especially on middle income 
countries that they motivate all but the most globally financially independent regimes (such 
as Iran) to adopt some variant of the Euro American neo liberal democracy. From our point 
of view, the ongoing transformation of capitalism is producing a global financial market and 
accompanying social institutions that engender economic constraints and threaten political 
consequences so powerful that they are coercing the entire gamut of regime types, from 
authoritarian to socialist, to adopt the neo liberal version of democracy favoured by 
markets.”    
 
Echoes of this line of argument are to be found in South Africa; Alec Erwin, a member of the 
ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) and former Minister of Trade and Industry, has 
argued that South Africa choices are limited to, “implement policy packages that are similar 
to those of other developing countries” (Marais; 2011, 112). And as long ago as 1997, 
Mandela himself had argued that integration of the capital markets “made it impossible to 
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decide national economic policy without regard for the likely response of the markets” (ibid). 
Yet it is clear that the response of the developing world to managing capital flows is far from 
uniform. For Marais (ibid), “...most promising emerging economies were violating many of 
the rules the South African government was straining to obey.”  
 
This is a review article; its purpose is to contribute to an ongoing debate on the use of the best 
available economic theory and evidence in monetary policy formulation in contemporary 
South Africa. In order to do so, I contrast South Africa's laissez-faire management of capital 
flows with the experience of other countries where the authorities have opted to use capital 
control techniques of one type or another.  The evidence is fairly substantial; capital control 
techniques can play a useful part in staving off fragility and financial crisis in the event of 
sharp surges in capital flows. The key idea is that capital control techniques would offer the 
authorities more freedom and flexibility in macroeconomic management. This article follows 
on from Mohammed (2010) who concludes that South African policy makers have not yet 
learned the relevant lessons stemming from their neoliberal embrace. This article takes up 
that theme and uses macroeconomic data to show that without capital controls South Africa 
courts a financial crisis that can be transmitted by at least any one of three channels.   
 
The article is arranged as follows; part one describes South Africa's historical experience with 
respect to capital flows. It does so within the context of financialisation and tries to show that 
in South Africa’s case, a confluence of international events and the local post apartheid 
reorganisation of the corporate world engendered a financialisation process with local origins. 
Hence in the South African case financialisation emanates from both local and international 
circumstances. Part two reviews some of the heterodox literature on financial crisis, and 
examines the way policy makers in selected countries have managed capital surges. Part three 
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reviews South Africa’s macroeconomic statistics and places South Africa in the first route. 
Part four serves as the conclusion.  
1.0 Financialisation and Capital Flows in South Africa  
As far as South Africa is concerned there are two parts to the capital flows story. First there is 
the steady, substantial and persistent capital outflow connected with a flight of capital as 
chronicled by Mohamed (2009) and by Ashman, Fine and Newman (2011). The other part of 
the story is the sudden stop surges associated with short term portfolio flows described in 
Mohamed (2010), Harris (2009) and other writers. Turning first to capital flight; this form of 
the export of capital is not new in South Africa; it is at least five decades old.   As a per cent 
of GDP, capital flight increased from 5.4% to 9.2% between 1980 and 1993. Between 1994 
and 2000 the average outward flow was about 12% of GDP, and between 2001-2007 it 
increased further to a giddy 23% of GDP in 2007 (Mohamed and Finnoff, 2005; Newman, 
2009).  
 
South Africa's social history is obviously unique. The apartheid state of the Nationalist Party 
unravelled at the same moment that global financial arrangements were taking on a neoliberal 
character and the country's reintroduction into the world economy took place alongside and 
simultaneously with a financialisation of economic global economic relations. In 1994, with 
the birth of democratic South Africa, it is global financialisation that frames the context for 
economic developments in South Africa.   
 
1.1 Financialisation    
When the Bretton Woods system of fixed currency arrangements broke down in 1971, the 
collapse unleashed three interrelated processes: privatization, liberalization/deregulation, and 
financial innovation.  "According to Kurtzman (1993: 60-1, in Nesvetailova 2007: 11), 
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“Nixon transformed it [the dollar as a real symbol of tangible wealth] into something totally 
new, a currency without any underlying value whatsoever and without any limitations on the 
government’s (or private sector’s) ability to create it.” Without the gold parity anchor of 
Bretton Woods, exchange rates became susceptible to the volatility/fluctuations of the new 
free-floating regime. Thus the exchange rate risk previously assumed by the state was 
transferred to markets. The public risk of the state in this way became the private risk of 
financial market agents (Eatwell and Taylor 2000: 12). In place of Bretton Woods the policy 
framework came to be determined by the removal of capital controls, the deregulation of 
exchange and interest rate regimes, and the elimination of barriers to trade in local and 
international markets" (McKenzie, 2011). This liberalization and deregulation of trade and 
capital markets is therefore to be viewed as a concomitant process associated with the 
privatization of credit and financial risk (Nesvetailova 2007: 12). The key idea arising from 
the collapse of Bretton Woods is that institutional and structural change induced 
transformations of the financial sector that ultimately fanned out like tentacles across the 
globe, engulfing its inhabitants in the logic of a latter day laissez-faire competitive 
capitalism. These are the institutional origins of the financialisation that has come to be the 
defining feature of contemporary capitalism.    
 
The financialisation of the world economy frames the context in which the momentous 
transformation from apartheid to democracy takes place. Mohamed (2009, 2) argues that the 
end of apartheid led to a reorganisation of big business in South Africa where capitalists “... 
acted to move capital out of the country."   At the level of the global political economy South 
Africa was inserted into the periphery as a supplier of extracted minerals. Historically, South 
Africa has had a long and close relationship with the United Kingdom. South Africa has also 
had as lengthy a relationship with the United States. It’s no surprise therefore that Anglo 
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Saxon capitalism has come to define the local business arrangements. According to Roux 
(1991, in Mohamed, 2009, 6) this has led to an over emphasis on speculation at the expense 
of productive investment.   
 
Internally the shape of business life in South Africa has been heavily influenced by the 
antagonism between English and Afrikaner capital. Mohamed (2009) argues that the 
competition between the two was partly eroded by cooperation between the apartheid state 
and English capital. Terreblanche (2002) argues that there was an, "extraordinary 
politicization" of the business sector during the 1970s as a result of close relationship with the 
government. "The new working relationship between business and government was sealed at 
the Carlton and Goodhope conferences in 1979 and 1981. At those conferences the corporate 
sector was given an institutional role, within the reorganized state sector, of formulating and 
implementing "free market" economic policies. Ever since this politicisation took place, the 
corporate sector has regarded an active role in political decision making as a birthright 
" (Terreblanche (2003, 74). As Mohamed (Ibid) puts it; "Big business worked to reform 
apartheid and the apartheid economy in a way that benefited their business interests."    
 
During the 1980s six conglomerates came to dominate business and economic life in South 
Africa: Anglo American Corporation, Sanlam, SA Mutual, Rembrandt, Anglovaal and 
Liberty Life.  All came from mining and insurance, and all owned merchant/investment 
banks. These conglomerates were subject to two waves of restructuring. In the 1980s there 
was a restructuring aimed at diversification. And in the 1990s another restructuring, this time 
aimed at concentration on core business functions.   I follow Mohamed (Ibid.), during the 
apartheid struggle the idea of black majority rule was anathema for big business and the 
Nationalist Party, the unprecedented levels of capital flight post 1992, the rise in offshore 
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listings and the calls for financial deregulation are associated with South African businesses 
sense of a "loss of power," and the fear of a black African government appropriating large 
swathes of capital. Ashman, Fine and Newman (2010) in explaining the capital flight of the 
period point out that the end of apartheid coincided with important changes (financialisation) 
in the world economy. The big business of the minerals export complex (MEC) embraced the 
process and the whole period has come to be defined in terms of the export of domestic 
capital. Thus it is the confluence of these events that explains the very high levels of capital 
flight. Like the US and UK firms, “South African corporations thus took the opportunity to 
internationalise their operations and to participate in the mergers and acquisition frenzy of 
the 1990s which also saw increasing concentration within many domestic sectors despite 
corporate unbundling." (Chabane, Goldstein and Roberts 2006 in Ashman, Fine and 
Newman 2010).”   
 
By 1996, South Africa had been incorporated into the neoliberal order and from 1998 the 
ANC government recognised and approved the right of the big MEC companies to move 
capital out of South Africa and into overseas financial centres (London, New York, Geneva, 
Melbourne etc.). Residual controls that limit investors to 15% offshore investments remain, 
but the South African Reserve Bank's (SARB's) Voluntary Disclosure Programme (VDP) of 
July 2010 offers amnesty to, "corporations and individuals disclosing their illegal 
expatriation of capital'" is seen by the SARB," as a first step to the complete liberalisation of 
outflows" (Ashman et al, 2011). This shift in policy has taken place alongside acute structural 
unemployment and declining domestic investment in the productive sectors of the economy. 
Thus insofar as South Africa is concerned neoliberalism has meant a financialisation process 
with a concomitant corporate restructuring where domestic macroeconomic policy is 
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sacrificed at the altar of "haute  finance,"  deepening inequalities and perpetuating the 
development of underdevelopment on the ground in the local arena (see Ashman et al, 2011).   
1.2 Capital Inflows   
According to Mohammed (2010) most of the flows entering South Africa have been short 
term portfolio flows. These flows have been absorbed by the private sector in the form of 
easier credit. Easier credit in the private sector has supported rentier and other non-productive 
activities. The circumstances somewhat mirror those of the USA. Easier credit fuelled 
massive equity price inflation on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and then major house 
price inflation. Household consumption surged and with it import levels, to such an extent 
that the Balance of Trade has turned negative. Private household consumption was itself 
fuelled by an enormous build up of private household debt. Consequently there is a systemic 
tendency to financial fragility further weakening in the ability of the country to withstand 
external shocks.  
 
One defining feature of capital flight story is the story of currency crashes. A currency crash 
is defined as a reversal in the nominal value of the currency of at least 15%. South Africa has 
had five of these crashes since 1996 - crashes that are brought about by surges and reversals 
in the flows of capital. The typical anatomy of a crash looks more or less like the 2001 rand 
crisis. "Net portfolio flows as a percentage of GDP declined temporarily after the Asian 
financial crisis and reached a record high (6.5% of GDP in 1999) before turning negative in 
2000 and crashing to a record low (-6.6% of GDP) in 2001. ... The sharp reversal in 
portfolio flows in 2000 led investors and currency speculators to realize that a drop in the 
value of the rand was imminent. This led to flight from rand - based assets that in turn led to 
panic and more flight. By the end of 2001 portfolio inflows crashed and the rand to US dollar 
exchange rate dropped by 35% " (Mohammed, (2010, 4). The transmission mechanism is 
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always the Balance of Payments and destabilisation may not reveal itself in the form of a 
sudden surge or sudden reversal crash. A persistent and significant inflow over a period of 
time poses its own problems. As foreign assets flow into a country they place upward 
pressure on the local currency. In time exports become uncompetitive and imports become 
cheaper. This vicious spiral can persist for quite some time if the flows themselves are 
persistent. But it can be transformed into a fully fledged crisis by a sudden reversal in the 
direction of the flows as experienced by South Africa in 2008.   
 
In Oct 2008, the JSE saw a huge decline, 10% in the second week alone, the currency 
declined by 9% in one week and then a further 10% in the following week. Manufacturing, 
mining and retail were thrown into a tailspin and six months later government figures were to 
show a quarterly decline in GDP of 6.4%. By 2009, The Economist (Feb 25, 2009 cited by 
Bond, 2010) had ranked South Africa as the most risky of a list of seventeen developing 
countries.  In the period 1992-2009 a huge balance of payments deficit opened up that Bond 
(ibid.) attributes to outflows of dividends and profits to London and Melbourne. In order to 
cover the deficit South Africa started on a borrowing spree - borrowing rose from $25 billion 
in 1994 to almost $80 billion in 2008. For Bond (ibid) the outflow of profits and dividends 
from the MEC firms is one of two reasons South Africa's current account deficit, “... has 
soared to amongst the highest in the world (in mid 2008 exceeded only by New Zealand)." 
The net result here is that South Africa is far more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of world 
financial markets.  In South Africa's case, inward capital flows have been found to be 
"positively correlated with large scale capital flight from the South African economy" 
(Ndikumana and Boyce, 2002 cited in Mohammed, 2010). Such a correlation suggests that 
when there is a surge in net capital flows it is also accompanied by "a significant increase in 
capital flight" (Mohammed, 2010, 24).   
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In summary we may say that the surges in net capital flows via the increase in private credit 
have led to:  
a) A financial bubble as represented by the price inflation of equity stock on the JSE.   
b) A housing bubble as represented by the house price inflation between 2002 and 2008   
c) Persistent trade deficits  
d) Increased household debt  
e) A persistent current account deficit (the highest in the G20)  
Contrary to orthodox interpretations instead of filling the investment gap we find that in 
South Africa's case these inflows have generally supported unproductive investment in 
shopping malls and car parks. Mohammed (ibid.) argues, "Based on import data it is possible 
to say that the increase in portfolio flows was associated with increased imports. Since 
investment levels did not increase at the same pace as import levels one deduces that there 
was increased imports of consumer goods." Instead of promoting a more robust South 
African economy, we find a tendency towards fragility as a direct consequence of the surges 
in portfolio investment.   
2.0 Palma’s Three Routes to Financial Crisis 
Gabriel Palma (2000) examined the period between liberalization of the economy and the 
onset of financial crisis in selected countries and devised what may be called “three stylized 
routes” to financial crisis. The three routes approximates to actual country experience as 
analysed by Palma. Route 1 (R1) is drawn from the Chilean experience. Route 2 (R2) from 
Korea, and route 3 (R3) Brazil.   
2.1 Chile   
On the back of a huge financial crisis in 1980, Chile undertook a series of structural reforms 
which marks the country out as perhaps the earliest experiment in neoliberalisation. Reforms 
included gradual but progressive liberalization of the capital account, privatisation of public 
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enterprises, social security and trade liberalisation. For Chile there were three main policy 
objectives: a) to lower inflation while at the same time avoiding currency appreciation. b) To 
promote exports. c) To alter the composition of flows by discouraging and reducing short 
term inflows. According to Edwards (1999), short term inflows represented 95% of all 
inflows.  Once again, the low interest rates prevailing in global markets coupled with the high 
interest rates needed to fight inflation domestically made for huge interest rate differentials 
and the hot money poured in. Edwards (Ibid) notes, gross private capital inflows increased 
from $0.9 billion in 1988 to $1.8 billion in 1990, to $2.8 billion in 1997.   
 
The URR was the main policy tool used. According to Cordero and Montecino, (2010), “... 
the URR was continually modified, increasing the rate and extending the types of credits 
subject to it." In 1991, the URR was 20%, and applied exclusively to, "foreign loans and 
fixed income securities. Any credits had to remain with the Central Bank for up to a year or 
up to a year without remuneration depending on the maturity” (Ibid.). The URR was raised to 
30% and extended so as to apply to trade credits and loans related to FDI in 1992. Again in 
1995, the URR was extended, this time so as to apply Chilean stock that traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange. 
 
Chile had retained controls on FDI so that FDI was subject to minimum stay requirements 
and profit repatriation taxes. In 1990, the minimum stay period was defined as 3 years and 
then lowered to one year in 1992 at the same time as repatriation restrictions were dropped. 
 
2.2 Korea 
South Korea’s growth performance over the last four decades of the 20th Century can only be 
described as stellar. In the period between 1960 and 2003 the country experienced negative 
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growth on two occasions, in 1980 and 1998 with growth itself averaging between 6% and 8% 
for the remaining years (World Development Indicators, 2004). Korea ran into difficulty 
when the opportunities for the type of emulatory technical catch up they had pursued were 
exhausted. This was growth via state-led industrial policy. There was quite an early emphasis 
on heavy industry, and later on, shipbuilding. In order to finance such large scale projects 
special public institutions were established and according to Nolan (2005,) private 
commercial banks were directed to make loans available to industrial policies “strategic” 
projects on a preferential basis. 
 
In terms of R2 country experiences, Korea’s main Achilles Heel in 1997 that made it 
particularly vulnerable to events in Thailand and Malaysia was its low ratio of foreign 
exchange holdings to short term debt. Its reserves could only cover half of its short term 
liabilities (Palma; 2000).  Both Palma (ibid) and Noland (2005) found that it was the Korean 
government itself through a system of perverse incentives to the corporate sector that was 
responsible for the build-up in short term debt. 
 
2.3 Brazil 
At the start of the 1990s Brazil faced two great macroeconomic challenges; it had a large 
fiscal deficit and stubbornly high inflation. The first response of the authorities was the Real 
Plan, which simultaneously sought to reduce the deficit (by cutting spending) and reduce 
inflation (Cordero and Montecino, 2010). The Real Plan was in effect a new monetary 
framework and it was based on two nominal anchors: an exchange rate anchor (pegging the 
local currency to the dollar) and a monetary anchor of “announced money supply targets 
intended to manage aggregate demand” (Ferrari-Filho and De Paula, 2003 in Cordero and 
Montecino, 2010). This new exchange rate system consisted of a daily crawling peg. To 
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defend the peg and contain inflation, interest rates had to be kept high. Once again this 
combination opened up large interest rate differentials. Again the hot money poured in. 
According to Cordero and Montecino (2010, 24), monthly private net capital flows increased 
by 25 times, from a monthly average of $39 million in 1988 to $970 million by 1995. 
 
Two main problems ensued - first the appreciation of the real (making Brazil’s exports 
uncompetitive) and the potentially destabilising effects of short term speculative capital. In 
1992, these pressures intensified, the exchange rate appreciated markedly, and more and 
more short term capital found its way into Brazil such that by 1995 two-thirds of all capital 
inflows were short term (Ibid). 
 
The authorities turned to capital controls, specifically; 
1. The minimum average amortisation time period for financials loans was extended. 
2. The use of trade credits was discouraged and the maximum time, “between when an export 
credit was received and the associated goods were shipped” was reduced from 360 days to 
180. (Ibid) 
3. The limit on Bank dollar denominated liabilities was lowered and the limit on dollar 
denominated assets was raised. Each bank’s net worth defined the limit on its liabilities and 
this limit was cut by 50% while the limit on assets was increased from $2million to $10 
million. 
4. A special channel for the sale of fixed income securities and commodity funds was created. 
These were in turn subject to an initial entrance tax of 5% which was subsequently altered to 
become inversely related to the maturity of the security in order to further encourage longer 
term investments (Ibid). 
The table below summarises Palma’s findings:  
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Table 1: Three Stylised Routes to Financial Crisis 
Route1: Chile, Mexico  Route2: Korea Route3: Brazil 
Explosion of credit to the 
private sector. 
Explosion of credit to private 
sector. 
Persistently high interest 
rates. 
Low levels of interest rates 
(after stabilization). 
Low levels of interest rates. Fragility in the banking 
system as a result of the high 
interest rates. 
Rapid revaluation of 
exchange rates. 
High levels of investment.
  
Fragility in public finance as a 
result of the high interest 
rates. 
Consumption boom. Very high corporate 
debt/equity ratios. 
Increase in the stock of 
public debt. 
Asset bubbles in stock 
market and real estate. 
Declining profitability across 
the economy. 
Increasing short term debt. 
Reduced level of savings. Government incentives for 
corporate sector to borrow 
short. 
Implosion of the real 
economy because of high 
rates. 
Major deterioration in 
current account. 
Major deterioration in 
current account. 
 
Low levels of residential 
construction. 
  
Increasing foreign debt.   
   
  
All R1 countries are characterized by a huge expansion in private consumer credit as 
countries try to absorb inflows. Route two (R2) countries are also characterized by a huge 
expansion in private credit, but this time, instead of an expansion in consumer credit, there is 
a huge expansion in private sector investment. Thus if the main similarity between R1 and R2 
countries is the extraordinary expansion in private credit, the main differentiating factor is the 
use that this expansion is put to; in R1 countries there is a consumption boom, in R2 countries 
there is a striking expansion in private investment. Malaysia and Thailand are hybrid cases 
that share characteristics of R1 and R2 countries. Malaysia doubles its private sector 
investment from 15% in 1988 to 30% in 1995 (Palma, 2000). 
What attracted the inflows in the first place? Palma argues that in R2 countries, “it is an 
endogenous pull for additional finance to bolster high levels of investment” and in R1 
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countries, “it is an exogenous push movement of foreign capital into these countries, which 
then has to create a need for itself.”  Palma (2000, 12) goes on to argue that R1 countries can 
“…be viewed as a rather peculiar case of Says Law, in which supply creates demand through 
fuelling expectations and optimism regarding the future performance of the economy. The 
circle reinforces itself becoming a self fulfilling prophecy. “Easy access to credit fuels 
expectations regarding the future prospects of the economy, prospects which are improved by 
the extra spending brought about the expanded credit and available foreign exchange. Thus 
over borrowing and over lending are not only the result of closely interrelated processes, but 
one that has a clear direction of causality.”  
According to Palma (ibid) Malaysia and Thailand each have one foot in both R1 and R2 
experiences. The surges in inflows were so large that the credit to the private sector in 
Malaysia grew from 67% of GDP to 135%, and in Thailand from 64% to 142% of GDP
1
. 
Thus they followed both routes simultaneously. First they followed R2 in that they needed 
high levels of external finance for their private investment programmes (mandated by 
ambitious industrial policies). But having satisfied these plans there was enough credit left 
over to fuel asset price inflation in both equities and real estate as in the R1 countries. In 
summary, in the R1 countries the expansion of consumer goods is enormous, “Not so in route 
2 countries where the additional credit was directed towards investment”2.  
R1 countries are further characterized by a rising share of private consumption to GDP ratio. 
In Chile this share increases from 65% to 75%, and in Mexico there is a corresponding 
                                                          
1 In these two countries credit expansion did not only fuel an increase in the share of consumption in 
GDP as it did in Latin America, but it was also associated  with a decline in this share (in Thailand 
from 56.7% to 54.8% and in Malaysia from 49.4% to 45.9%). 
 
2 The corresponding figures for Malaysia and Thailand are low (annual rates of growth of these 
imports are 16% and 19%) as these countries direct additional credit towards investment (R2) and 
asset bubbles (R1) but not to consumption (R1). 
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increase from 68% to 78% of GDP. The share of savings to GDP ratio fell from 20% to 10% 
in Mexico, and in Chile this share stood at 1.7% of GDP.  
Brazil is an R3 country.  Here there is credit contraction as the authorities act to curtail 
expansion by placing an “iron curtain” around incoming flows.  The iron curtain consists of 
increasing reserves, high degrees of sterilization and high interest rates. In Brazil, despite 
massive inflows the share of private investment in GDP was maintained at 15%, the share of 
consumption increased from 62.7% in 1994 to 64.4% in 1998 and the share of private savings 
fell from 18% to 14% between 1995 and 1998. In the case of Brazil mainly as a result of the 
high interest rate policy and a more cautious trade liberalization policy, imports of consumer 
goods did not grow anywhere as near as quickly as in Chile and Mexico. What distinguishes 
the R3 country from the others is that interest rates not only start at a much higher levels but 
they are not allowed to fall to anywhere near R1 or R2 levels. 
According to Palma Brazil is an important case in a critique of the moral hazard explanations 
of the mainstream.  According to that line of argument, “… the main cause of agents losing 
their capacity to price risk is that external and internal moral hazards lead to artificially low 
interest rates;  these in turn gave a false incentive to agents  to accumulate excessive risk” 
(McKinnon and Pill  in Palma; 2000, 17). This just did not happen in the Brazil case. 
3.0 The South African Macroeconomic Data  
Turning now to South Africa, an examination of the main macroeconomic data can show 
whether or not the local experience conforms to any of Palma’s three stylized routes. The 
value of the exercise from a South African point of view is that having identified a stylized 
path, policy prescriptions can be constructed that represents a best practice that is derived 
from the experience of other countries based on all the available theory and evidence. 
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3.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Figure 1 (below) shows South Africa’s GDP from 1990 to 2010. In that period, the average 
quarterly GDP growth rate has been 3.3%. With the abandonment of the apartheid state and 
the transition to democracy, GDP growth peaked at 7.6% in December 1994, and in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008 it fell to its lowest point of -5.9% in March 2009. 
The average annual GDP growth rate in the period under consideration stands at 3.2%, it 
reached a historical high of 7.1% in December 2006 and a low of -2.6% in June of 2009. The 
performance is on the face of it unspectacular, but steady. But viewed from the point of view 
of the Growth, Employment and Distribution (GEAR, 1996, 3)
3
 document, the performance 
is short of the 6% (du Plessis and Smit, 2006). 
Figure 1: GDP  
Source : (Quantec) 
                                                          
3
 A neoliberal strategy introduced by ex Finance Minister Trevor Manuel covering the period 
1996-2000. 
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Figure 3.2 below shows the composition of GDP. The clear trend ever since 1992 has been 
the expansion of household consumption. It is this private consumption which has been 
driving growth. A consumption that Mohamed (2009) argues has been financed with debt. 
The Gross fixed capital formation and government consumption components experience 
steady and gradual increase over the period.  
Fig. 3.2 HERE 
 
3.3 Unemployment rate  
South Africa’s unemployment rate (Fig 3.3, see below), stands at 25%. The South African 
Authorities estimate that the economy has to grow at 6% per annum in order to halve  
the countries unemployment rate by 2014. The average for the period stands at 26.3%  
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with the record high recorded at 31% in March 2003 and a low of 23% in September 2007.  
Getting these stubbornly high rates of unemployment down is the focus of the New Growth  
Path (NGP); heterodox literature on the subject calls for reordering of priorities in order to  
decrease stubbornly high rates of unemployment
4
. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Unemployment Rates 
 Source : (Quantec) 
                                                          
4
 Such literature would include Epstein, 2003, 2004, Pollin, Ndikuma et al who generally argue that monetary 
policy in S Africa should be “employment generating.” 
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3.4 Gini Coefficient 
The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which income (sometimes consumption) is 
distributed among agents in a country
5. South Africa’s Gini over the years under review (See 
Fig. 3.4) has remained virtually the same around 65. Obviously such a high coefficient makes 
South Africa one of the most unequal countries in the world. According to the World Bank 
the top 10% of income earners in South Africa have an income share of 57%. This inequity is 
closely related to the unemployment story and addressing one is by default to address the 
other.  
The growth, unemployment and inequality statistics (together) speak to a growth through 
inequality strategy that can be said to characterize much of the period..  
Figure 3.4: Gini Coefficient 
Source : (South African Presidency) 
                                                          
5
 A coefficient of 0 would mean perfect equality and one of 100 would represent perfect 
inequality. 
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3.5 Inflation rate 
For the period under review, South Africa’s inflation rate (Figure 3.5 below) has averaged 
10%. It reached its highest point of 17% in January 1992 and its lowest of 0.10% in January 
2004. In 2000, South Africa formally adopted an inflation targeting approach. The aim was 
to bring double digit inflation under control. The target was set to keep inflation to a band 
between 3% and 6% of the Consumer Price Index (excluding mortgage costs) on an annual 
basis. Price stability has been the number one macroeconomic target and the authorities enjoy 
a fair amount of success in this regard.  The line of demarcation between monetary 
economists lies in the approach to inflation and employment. The heterodox literature as 
represented by Crotty and Epstein (1996), Epstein (2003), Pollin et al (2007), has long since 
argued for a reordering of priorities where employment becomes the number one target. 
Mainstream orthodoxy has steadfastly advocated the primacy of price stability. 
Figure 3.5  
 Source : (Quantec) 
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3.6 Net Capital Flows as a % of GDP 
Figure 3.6 (below) shows the scale and magnitude of the surges and reversals that have come 
to characterize the current period. Financial account and other investment are the flows 
associated with capital flows into bank accounts (loans and other bank based products), and 
Portfolio Investment are the flows that come from buying and selling bonds and shares. 
These are the flows associated with capital account movements. Volatility begins in 1996 and 
intensifies thereafter. In 1996 net capital flows comprised less than 1% of GDP. By 2008 the 
swings are such that net portfolio flows (the most volatile of the components) could be plus 
or minus 8% of GDP in little more than a year (as we saw in 2008).  
Portfolio investment is of course the most volatile component of the capital account. Between 
1990 and 2010 there is first between 1990 and 1993 a period of small steady outflows. 
Starting in 1993 there is a significant decline; there is a sudden sharp reversal that takes us 
back to 1990 levels and lasts until the middle of 2003, when a another sudden sharp and 
deeper reversal takes hold and eventually finds a bottom near the end of 2006. A surge in 
inflows thereafter sees net portfolio investment reverse its direction and make all lost ground 
to peak in 2008 with a small positive net inflow (the only positive net inflow in the period 
under review. At this point there is another precipitous decline that continues to the end of the 
period. There can be no doubt that these surges and reversals are highly disruptive and 
destabilizing. 
23 
 
Fig.3.6 
 
3.7 Current account Balance
6
 
As Figure 3.7 (below) shows, the current account balance is a story in two parts. First there 
are relatively small and stable positive and negative balances until 2002, then starting in the 
middle of 2002 there is a precipitous decline to a deficit of R16.4 billion (or 7% of GDP) in 
December 2008.  
                                                          
6
 This balance represents a nation’s net income. It is the sum of the net balance of trade, plus net transfer 
payments, plus net factor payments.  
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Figure 3.7 
 Source : (South African Reserve Bank , Quarterly Bulletin)  
The early 1990’s saw a period of moderate surpluses, as South Africa made its transition to 
democracy in 1994, South Africa’s international stature grew and its surpluses turned to 
moderate deficits as more and more the country began to be perceived as a preferred 
destination for foreign investment. In 2001 and 2002 this pattern was interrupted as the 
events of 9/11 induced a period of financial contraction. Since then, the deficits have gone on 
to unprecedented levels to the extent that there is a serious question around sustainability. 
3.8 Exchange rates 
When a nation records a strong current account performance, its GDP is boosted by its export 
revenues. GDP expands and the currency appreciates against the countries major trading 
partners in the world. As Figure 3.8 shows starting from a low of just over R2 in 1990 there 
was a steady depreciation of the rand up to 2003. The US$/ZAR exchange rate reached a high 
of 10.15.  According to Frankel (2006), “the 2003-2006 real appreciation of the rand can be 
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attributed to the Dutch Disease. In other respects, the rand behaves like currencies of 
industrialised countries with well-developed financial markets.” During 2006-2010 the US$ 
traded within a range just above R6.00 to R8.30. Starting in January of 2011, a 25% currency 
depreciation occurred in South Africa, and the Rand monetary area (Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland) and also in Botswana. The depreciation is the direct consequence of the ongoing 
Eurozone crisis as investors pull back from emerging markets in general and South Africa in 
particular.  
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Figure 3.8 
 
Source : (Quantec) 
 
 
 
3.9 Reserve Position US$ 
The reserve position (Figure 3.9) is the stock of all financial assets available to the SARB and 
government to meet South African balance of payments needs. It includes foreign currency, 
gold and holdings of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDR’s). The first half of the 1990s shows 
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increases and the magnitude of divergence between the change in “gross” and “net” reserves 
assumes greater and greater magnitudes culminating in 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 
 Source : (Quantec) 
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3.10 Absa House Index 
The Absa House Index (Figure 3.10, below) evidences the real estate price inflation that has 
taken hold in South Africa. The steepest and most dramatic increase has been in the prices of 
luxury houses of the rich and affluent. But the middle income housing of the middle class 
shows a persistent increase. Low income housing has experienced a slight increase in price. 
Aggregated we have a considerable increase in the prices of homes over the period. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.10 
 Source : (Quantec) 
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3.11 Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) All Share Index 
Figure 3.11 (below) shows the JSE index gradually increasing from just over 21.33 in 1990 to 
70.44 in 2002. There then followed the only decline recorded for the period from 70.74 in 
2002, to 61.77 in 2003.Thereafter there is a steep increase to 2007 when the index reached an 
all time high of 188.27. Over 2008 there was an equally steep decline to 94.77 in 2009. The 
index finished the period at slightly over 1996. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.11 
 Source : (Quantec) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
J
S
E
 A
ll
 S
h
a
re
s
 I
n
d
e
x
Year
SOUTH AFRICA - SHARE PRICES: ALL SHARES (INDEX NUMBER, AQM, DEC, AVERAGE)
30 
 
3.12 Balance of Trade 
The balance of trade is the difference between the country’s exports and imports on visible 
trade. It tells us what a country is earning on its exports and imports. Figure 3.12 shows that 
between 1990 and 2004, South Africa has a positive trade balance. In 2004, the trade balance 
goes into deficit; thereafter South Africa imports more than it exports. The decline comes to 
an end in 2007 when South Africa reports a trade deficit of US$5160.5M. From 2007 the 
trade balance recovers to US$3837.9M.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 
 Source : (Quantec) 
-6E+09
-4E+09
-2E+09
0
2E+09
4E+09
6E+09
8E+09
1E+10
B
a
la
n
c
e
 o
f 
T
ra
d
e
Year
SOUTH AFRICA - TRADE BALANCE (US DOLLARS MILLIONS, AQ, DEC, FLOW)
31 
 
4.0 Conclusion – What are the Policy Lessons? 
The foregoing review of South Africa’s macro economic data reveal a number of economic 
phenomenon which closely parallel the R1 countries in Palma’s stylized facts. Apart from 
volatility we see a deteriorating balance on the capital account, volatility in the balance on 
current account and the trade balance. The house price appreciation and huge increase in the 
JSE index all speak to the bubbles that we have seen elsewhere in the world and now 
represent a fairly constant feature of the financial crisis story. On balance we can conclude 
that South Africa sits (more or less neatly) into R1 of the three stylized routes to crisis. What 
are the policy implications? 
As Chile is a R1 country its experience is particularly relevant
7
. Chile’s use of capital 
controls is perhaps less controversial and more cut and dried in their outcomes than many 
others, and the evidence above suggests that South Africa should apply the same price based 
controls in its own monetary policy. None other than Joseph Stiglitz (1999) was to champion 
the use of “Chilean style” URR by developing countries seeking to avoid fragility and/or 
crisis as a result the mobility of capital (Cordero and Montecino, 2010). Also, there is a wide 
consensus that accepts that the Chilean authorities increased monetary policy independence 
and were successful in altering the composition of the inflows. Where there is disagreement it 
is on the extent to which the controls were able to suppress the appreciation of the currency 
and decrease the volume of the flows. Frenkel and Repetti (2010) report that the controls had 
a critical impact on Chile’s ability to maintain a stable and competitive exchange rate while 
keeping inflation under control.  
It may also be of some importance for South African policy makers to know that Chile 
employed capital controls, with no loss of its neo liberal credentials. The controls in the 
                                                          
7
 Mexico is the other R1 country cited by Palma. 
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Chilean case were a pragmatic response to the destabilization of a looming crisis. This may 
help to loosen the current straight jacket that neoliberal alignment seems to have imposed. 
Arising out of the review undertaken for this study it is clear that all countries that faced 
sudden surges and reversals in capital flows also faced a common set of related 
issues/questions; first, there is the question of the changing composition of capital inflows, 
second, the progressive deterioration in the term structure of loans, and last, what Palma calls, 
“attack from within.” If this article is the first step in the contribution to the debate on the use 
of the best theory and evidence in policy, then it follows that the wider and ongoing research 
programme should seek to develop in any one of these three directions around any or all of 
these three issues. 
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